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Abstract 
Researchers often pursue proof of concept research, but criteria for evaluating such research 
remain poorly specified. This paper proposes a general framework for proof of concept 
research that knits together and augments earlier discussions. The framework includes 
prototypes, proof of concept demonstrations, and post facto demonstrations. With a case 
from theoretical evolutionary genetics, the paper illustrates the general framework and 
articulates some of the reasoning strategies used within that field. This paper provides both 
specific tools with which to understand how researchers evaluate models in theoretical 
evolutionary genetics, and general tools that apply to proof of concept research more 
generally. 
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1- Introduction  
Proof of concept research is ubiquitous in science. Scientists commonly characterize 
early stage research as that of proof of concepts or proof of principles (e.g., Gould 2005; 
Servedio et al. 2014).1 They employ it in many disciplines, from medicine and theoretical 
biology to engineering, and it can involve everything from exploratory work and testing 
causal hypotheses to data mining and computer simulation. Furthermore, funding agencies 
have developed programs for proof of concept research, though these often focus on 
translating scientific research into marketable widgets (e.g., NSF 2017). Given this 
heterogeneity of proof of concept research, how do scientists judge it as successful or not?  
Philosophers have just begun to study and articulate general frameworks and 
evaluation criteria for proof of concept research. A promising route to do so is to study how 
scientists conduct and evaluate proof of concept research in practice (Plutynski 2005; Kendig 
2016). This strategy aligns with similar efforts for studying and articulating evaluation 
criteria in kindred parts of science, such as in exploratory experimentation (Elliott 2007), 
data science (Elliott et al. 2016; Leonelli 2016), and simulation science (Winsberg 2015). By 
studying scientific practices and articulating these frameworks, philosophers better describe 
varieties of arguments and criteria that scientists use to evaluate their work and that of their 
peers. Once explicit, these criteria can be further studied, critiqued, and refined; and they can 
 
1 In this paper, I treat ‘proof of concept’ as synonymous with ‘proof of principle’, as is often 
done by researchers themselves (e.g., Schmidt 2006, 49). 
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be used to foster epistemological research into understudied institutions of science, such as 
funding agencies (O’Malley et al. 2009; Haufe 2013). 
In this paper, I propose a general framework for proof of concept research, and I 
describe some of the arguments researchers use to evaluate proof of concept research as 
successful or not. Briefly, researchers who conduct proof of concept research aim to establish 
a prototype, and to argue for the continued development of that prototype in settings beyond 
those in which it was established. The “concept” proved in such research is that the prototype 
achieves functions or results expected or desired of it. The framework includes three primary 
parts: prototypes; proof of concept demonstrations, which establish that prototypes achieve 
their expected or desired results; and post facto arguments, which use heuristics to argue 
pragmatically for the further development of prototypes. This framework knits together and 
augments various aspects of previous discussions about proof of concept research so as to 
apply across the sciences. But the framework is not exhaustive. One route to develop it is to 
describe the varieties or kinds of prototypes, proof of concept demonstrations, and post facto 
arguments that scientists use in practice in many different fields. I do so here for theoretical 
evolutionary genetics.  
Given longstanding debates about the value of theoretical evolutionary genetics and 
the results generated within it (Rao and Nanjudiah 2011; Okasha 2012), many have sought to 
account for how it yields good science. Recently, a team of theoreticians argued influentially 
that theoretical evolutionary genetics yields models that function as proofs of concepts 
(Servedio et al. 2014). That argument is consistent with Anya Plutynski’s independently-
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developed account of population genetics as providing proofs of principles or of possibilities 
(2004; 2005; 2006a; 2006b). Here, I articulate some of the arguments used to evaluate 
prototype models in theoretical evolutionary genetics and show how they fit the general 
framework for proof of concept research. My discussion of these kinds of arguments isn’t 
exhaustive, nor are the kinds of arguments articulated here always invoked, but they do 
reveal how biologists sometimes argue for theoretical evolutionary modelling as worthwhile 
both epistemically and pragmatically.  
To develop and illustrate the general framework and articulate some evaluation 
criteria used in theoretical evolutionary genetics, I pursue the following strategy. In the next 
section I review contemporary discussions of proof of concept research, and in section 3 I 
knit them together and augment them in a general framework. Next I describe a case of a 
recent project that fits the kind of research characterized as proof of concept by Servedio et 
al. (2014). In section 5, I show how the case illustrates my accounts of prototypes and of 
proof of concept demonstrations. I also articulate two kinds of more specific demonstrations 
used in the case: coherence models calibration (CMC) and scope demonstration. In section 6, 
I articulate three heuristics used in post facto arguments, and I illustrate their use in the case 
study. Given the heterogeneity of proof of concept research, I don’t claim that my discussion 
here exhausts it. Instead, I conclude by indicating further routes by which to develop the 
framework.       
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2- Contemporary Views of Proof of Concept Research              
Among philosophers, Catherine Kendig has done the most to elucidate proof of 
concept research, illustrating it with cases from synthetic biology (Kendig 2016).2 For 
Kendig, proofs are experiments with which researchers show that a hypothetical model, the 
concept, obtains in a test case. She discusses cases in which researchers first engineered 
Cyanobacteria to efficiently produce biofuels. These researchers engineered Cyanobacteria, 
they specified the causal hypothesis about producing biofuel as the focal concept, and they 
proved the concept with wet-lab experiments involving the bacteria. Kendig says that these 
experiments, taken as practices, shape knowledge-making categories, of which she highlights 
the concept of reengineering systems and processes, that enable generalization.  
Kendig says that an experimental proof shows that a causal hypothesis is possibly 
true for a wider range of items like the object studied. After the experimental proof in the 
biofuel case, researchers classed the reengineered Cyanobacteria as good chassis organisms 
for further biofuel research. For Kendig, the general assumption distinctive of such 
experimental proof of concept research is that “if it works here, it will also [work] in all 
cases like this,” when like cases share causal mechanisms, structures, functions, etc. (Kendig 
2016, 740 [Kendig’s italics]). She calls this a projectability assumption, and she indicates a 
 
2 Kendig distinguishes proof of concept research from proof of principle judgements, the 
latter of which are ethical judgments that supervene on the former, and will not factor into 
my discussion here. 
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somewhat broader version, arguing that successful test cases provide “justification in practice 
of the potential transportability of that research,” including both the concept proved and the 
practices used to do so (Kendig 2016, 737). This second assumption involves only potential 
transportability, whereas the first implies a stronger projection to all like cases.  
Kendig’s discussion is a good starting point, providing several aspects for further 
development. First, the two projectability assumptions, and their application in cases, might 
be fruitfully elucidated to indicate how the assumptions are used differently. Second, it’s not 
clear how the projectability assumptions Kendig proposes differ from those used in other 
experimental projects not normally classed as proof of concept research. Consider situations 
in which synthetic biologists show how to use the already-established Cyanobacteria chassis 
to produce biofuel more efficiently, or with a slightly altered component set. Both of 
Kendig’s projectability assumptions apply in these situations, indicating that research that 
involves perhaps any tweak to a research design or object of study should be classed as proof 
of concept. If so, then a wider array of research than is often presumed should be classed as 
proofs of concepts. A different strategy would argue that there are some other aspects of 
proof of concepts research, beyond the application of the projectability assumptions, that 
more specifically characterize proof of concept research. I later pursue this second strategy 
by invoking the discipline-relative novelty of prototypes studied. Third, while synthetic 
biologists often employ computer simulations, Kendig focuses on wet-lab experiments. Her 
discussion can be complemented with accounts of how researchers evaluate and export 
computer models from other investigative contexts, especially more theoretical ones.     
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 For theoretical investigations, Axel Gelfert argues that proofs of principles provide 
one criterion for evaluating the success of models (Gelfert 2016; 2018). He says that models 
function as proofs of principles when they establish that a “type of approach or methodology 
is able to generate potential representations of target phenomena,” which he illustrates with 
Lotka-Volterra modelling, and he coins the useful term of “proof of principle 
demonstrations” to denote the things that do so (Gelfert 2016, 85). Ultimately, however, 
Gelfert’s goal is to relate proof of principle research to his broader account of exploratory 
modelling, and he doesn’t articulate forms for such demonstrations.    
For evolutionary genetics in particular, Anya Plutynski argues that theoreticians 
provide proofs of principle or of possibility. When they demonstrate theorems, as did Fisher 
with his fundamental theorem of natural selection, they establish which conditions (e.g., 
population size, drift, etc.) influence a process (e.g., natural selection) that yields a general 
phenomenon (e.g., evolutionary change), and which conditions don't (e.g., orthogenesis, 
saltation) (Plutynski 2005; 2006b). When they analytically infer results from models, they 
prove "what must be so, for any population that fits (ceteris paribus) the description [of] the 
model," (Plutynski 2004, 1205). Either way, theoreticians explain which evolutionary 
phenomena are possible and/or necessary within a precise theoretical framework.  
Plutynski notes that the role of theoretical models and of analytical results can change 
over time. Early in a research program, they can establish the explanatory scope of a 
framework (e.g., mathematized selection), they can obviate competing programs (e.g., 
orthogenesis), and they can show how to unify seemingly incompatible frameworks (e.g., 
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Mendelism and biometry) (Plutynski 2004; 2005; 2006a; 2006b). Later, they might be used 
alongside other modelling strategies to provide a consilience of induction for a given 
evolutionary claim that otherwise lacks more direct evidential support, rendering that claim 
plausible (Plutynski 2001). 
Plutynski's account suggests several routes for further development. Most 
importantly, she illustrates a philosophical program for articulating the wider variety of 
criteria that evolutionary geneticists use in practice to evaluate precision frameworks, 
theorems, and models. Two such criteria stand out for further articulation: how analytically-
inferred results relate (1) to results inferred from theories couched in natural language, and 
(2) to results generated via computer simulation, now widely used among theoreticians, as 
cursorily discussed by Plutynski. Second, Plutynski showed that theoreticians also evaluate 
analytical results in relation to the prospects for competing research programs. Still to be 
articulated, however, are the structures of the arguments researchers use in making those 
assessments, especially in nascent projects. 
 Among biologists, a team led by Maria Servedio has recently proposed an influential 
framework for proof of concept research in theoretical evolutionary genetics (Servedio et al. 
2014). They propose that a “clear verbal model lays out explicitly which biological factors 
and processes it is (and is not) considering and follows a chain of logic from these initial 
assumptions to conclusions about how these factors interact to produce biological patterns,” 
(Servedio et al. 2014, 2; compare with Plutynski 2006b, 61). But given that such processes 
are often complex, reasoning via verbal models alone is often too imprecise to settle 
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disagreements about their soundness. Proof of concept models explicate the verbal model in a 
precise mathematical framework, make previously implicit assumptions explicit, and enable 
more precise and explicit chains of reasoning from models to consequences. By doing so, 
such models have a unique function. “The models themselves are tests of whether verbal 
models are sound; if their predictions do not match, the verbal model is flawed, and that form 
of the hypothesis is disproved (Servedio et al. 2–3 [Servedio et al.’s italics]).   
This account has strengths and weaknesses. It provides a unique role for proof of 
concept research within theoretical evolutionary genetics, and it captures much of how 
theoreticians evaluate proof of concept models. But it also conflates concepts of models with 
that of chains of reasoning that invoke models, saying that mathematical models are 
themselves tests of verbal models. Furthermore, the account assumes that the only form of 
reasoning used to evaluate mathematical models as proofs of concepts is via comparison of 
predictions across verbal and analytical models. There is more to be said about the kinds of 
reasoning used in proof of concept research, especially for cases involving numerical 
computer simulations, now widely employed among theorists.  
The accounts above miss many of the practical motives researchers have for 
conducting proof of concept research. Biomedical researchers are more explicit about these 
motives. For them, proof of concept research is as an aspect of Phases I or II in the standard 
IV-Phase evaluation process for therapeutic drugs and vaccines (Schmidt 2006). They note 
that such studies aim to roughly estimate treatment effect sizes so that researchers can design 
later-phase studies about the effectiveness of medicines (Gould 2005). Such studies also help 
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researchers decide whether or not to proceed with further studies, and if successful, they 
enable researchers to recruit collaborators and secure funding for further studies (Schmidt 
2006). 
While all of those previous discussions are suggestive of a general framework for 
proof of concept research that applies across empirical and theoretical projects, none 
provides one. Given their focuses on particular sciences (experimental synthetic biology, 
theoretical evolution, medicine), they can appear narrow in scope. Furthermore, while they 
discuss the kinds of arguments and evaluation criteria used in proof of concept research, only 
a few have been sketched. In the next section, I knit together aspects from the previous 
discussions to address those two issues.  
 
3- A General Framework 
 Proof of concept research aims to establish that prototypes achieve functions or 
results desired of them, and to argue for their continued development in settings beyond 
those in which they were established. A general framework for proof of concept research 
includes prototypes, proof of concept demonstrations, and post facto arguments.  
Prototypes are artifacts that are importantly novel compared to their historical 
forerunners. This novelty, rather than the potential for exportability, distinguishes proof of 
concept research from later-stage research. Prototypes can be engineered physical items, and 
they can be theories or models. Forerunners are any items used prior to a prototype, but that 
may be similar in some sense to the prototype in structure or application, and that may 
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provide pieces cannibalized and reused in the prototype. Researchers judge the novelty of 
prototypes relative to disciplinary norms. What those in one discipline consider novel, those 
in another might consider just a tweak to an extant artifact. Researchers evaluate prototypes 
with proof of concept demonstrations. Prototypes can be negatively evaluated, or fall short of 
the standards of a proof of concept demonstrations, and still be prototypes. They are just 
failed prototypes.3 Kendig, Schmidt, and Gould focus on prototypes as physical artifacts like 
engineered bacteria cultures or medicines. Plutynski, Gelfert, and Servedio’s team focus on 
models and theories. Regardless, they talk about novel artifacts at the leading edge of 
science.4 
 
3 The term prototype has a more neutral connotation than does Gelfert’s (2016; 2018) phrase 
proof of principle model, and it avoids confusions invited by ambiguous modifications like 
failed proof of principle models.  
4 Prototypes can be other things not detailed here. Surgeries provide intriguing cases in which 
the prototype (the practice itself) and the method of demonstration might be usefully 
identified with each other. Prototypes might also be conceived in some cases as combinations 
of practices, physical artifacts, and theories; as when investigators develop new techniques to 
implant into a patient or animal model a novel device that will affect a hitherto speculative 
causal mechanism, say a brain implant to lessen narcolepsy. In such cases, neither the 
techniques, the device, nor the theory can be established as functional apart from each other. 
These complex prototypes provide interesting objects for further study.  
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Proof of concept demonstrations show that prototypes achieve functions or results 
desired of them. For physical artifacts, these demonstrations may be performances of a 
prototype staged for an audience, as with a launch of a novel rocket. More often these 
demonstrations are chains of reasoning or arguments that can be published. For physical 
prototypes, as in Kendig’s biofuel case, these arguments relate data to descriptions of the 
prototype for empirical evaluation. For prototype theories or models, taken as abstract 
artifacts, these arguments show that the prototypes achieve epistemic functions or aims, such 
as describing, predicting, or explaining phenomena. Furthermore, those demonstrations may 
be modal, as with how-possible or how-actual explanations. In many cases, the kinds of 
arguments are not unique to early stage research. Scientists throughout the sciences and 
throughout different stages of research use arguments to show that theories and models 
perform epistemic functions. These arguments become proof of concept demonstrations only 
when they involve prototypes. In such cases, the phenomenon of interest may also be more 
circumscribed than in later stages of research. This account of proof of concept 
demonstrations augments Gelfert’s (2016; 2018) discussion by explicitly invoking notions of 
chains of reasoning or arguments, by applying both in theoretical and in empirical 
investigations, and by acknowledging different modalities of phenomena as legitimate 
objects of study.  
Finally, post facto arguments are arguments that researchers use after they have 
established a prototype with a proof of concept demonstration. Post facto arguments rely on 
fallible heuristics to argue for further research that uses the prototypes in question. It is these 
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arguments, and their anticipated uses, that provide scientists with motivations for designing 
and conducting proof of concept research.  
Post facto arguments license practical claims about how prototypes might further be 
used in new or expanded research projects. Researchers often design prototypes to be simple 
with the idea that, if they are positively evaluated, then they provide templates on which to 
build and evaluate more complex physical artifacts, models, or theories. Despite a 
demonstrated proof of concept, researchers often lack substantial justifications, characteristic 
of later-stages of research, for exporting these prototypes to further investigative contexts or 
for projecting early results to larger classes. This lack of substantial justification is due to the 
simplicity and novelty of prototypes, and to the fact that proof of concept research is often at 
the most distal leading edge of research, where relevant data and analyses are often scarce. 
Post facto arguments thus rely on fallible heuristics, like the projectability assumptions 
discussed by Kendig. They also underwrite arguments for comparatively evaluating 
competing research programs, as discussed by Plutynski. And they license practical issues of 
research, such as for expending further resources to develop prototypes or protocols, or 
conducting later stage research, as discussed by Gould and Schmidt.   
 This general framework for proof of concept research knits together and augments 
earlier insights about proof of concept research. The framework also enables a philosophical 
program of articulating the different kinds of proof of concept demonstrations and post facto 
arguments that scientists use in practice. In the sections to follow, I illustrate this program 
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with a case study from theoretical evolutionary genetics.5 Unlike previous discussions, I 
focus on a project that involves computer simulations. I show how the case illustrates each 
part of the framework, I articulate structures for proof of concept demonstrations heretofore 
undescribed, and I make explicit the kinds of heuristics the team used in post facto 
arguments. In so doing, the case study indicates how scientists sometimes judge results from 
theoretical population genetics as both epistemically and practically valuable.   
 
4- Case Description 
Constructing Multi-Model Systems  
In 1998, Norman Johnson and Adam Porter at the University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst, began a project to study the genetics of speciation. They focused on speciation due 
to hybrid incompatibilities (HI), which they’d independently studied in animal populations. 
HI occurs when parents from related but distinct lineages yield hybrid offspring that are less 
fit than are the parents. Johnson and Porter felt that extant models for the genetics of HI 
failed to adequately capture how genes functioned in relation to each other, yielding 
unrealistic models and results. Johnson and Porter focused on epistasis, the phenomenon by 
which the products of multiple genes affect a single phenotype; and on pleiotropy, the 
 
5 The case exemplifies the kind of research discussed by Servedio et al. (2014), and the 
principle investigator has stated in personal communication that he conceptualizes the project 
along those lines.  
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phenomenon by which the products of a single gene affect multiple phenotypes. They 
thought that the mechanistic details of those phenomena could importantly affect HI, and that 
they could show how with quantifiable precision. I discuss the history of their project up to 
2008. 
Johnson and Porter (JP) began with a rough verbal model, in the sense of (Servedio et 
al. 2014), of the phenomenon they wanted to study. They later presented that model as a 
proposition for which they would study its plausibility. “We propose that regulated genetic 
pathways are a biologically realistic way to provide the complex epistatic gene interaction 
seen in empirical studies of hybrid fitness reduction. Here we investigate the plausibility of 
this proposition”, (Johnson and Porter 2000, 528). The quote indicates a verbal prediction: 
that gene regulatory processes, when varied across individuals within populations, can affect 
processes of HI and speciation. To quantifiably investigate the plausibility of that verbal 
model, JP developed a theoretical system of at least four models. Due to constraints on 
resources, JP opted to evaluate the multi-model system analytically and with individual-
based computer simulations, rather than with actual populations. They ran their initial 
simulations in 1998 and 1999, publishing them in (Johnson and Porter 2000). The results 
netted them an NSF grant in 2000 to sustain their project into the mid 2000s. 
The first model in the multi-model system, implicit in the verbal model, was a 
standard framework for how populations diverged from one another and speciated. In this 
framework, called the Bateson, Dobzhansky, Muller (BDM) model of speciation, two 
lineages of a founder population are prevented from interbreeding due to something like 
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barriers or large distances between them. At regular intervals across generations, researchers 
enable a set of hybrids across the two lineages, and they compare the fitnesses of the hybrids 
to those of their parents. If the hybrids are less fit than their parents, then the researchers 
conclude that speciation is underway, and once hybrids aren’t reproductively viable, the two 
lineages are distinct species. If JP could show that in BDM-like situations, selection on the 
mechanistic details of pleiotropy and epistasis could lead to HI, then they would show that 
those details influenced speciation processes. 
The second model in the system was a mechanistic model for gene regulatory 
epistasis (Figure 1) that applied at the molecular level within organisms. Developmental 
geneticists usually study epistasis as a set of regulatory processes that include: genes 
producing RNAs and proteins; those RNA and protein products moving within and between 
cells; and those products attaching to target genes or putting in motion other molecules that 
attach to target genes. By attaching to target genes, molecules affect if, when, where in the 
organism, and how much those targeted genes produce their own products. Simple models 
often take the form of cartoons that represent a few genes, their products, the movements of 
those products, and their physical interactions.6 JP introduced a concept of binding strength. 
This concept enabled a numerical assessment of fit between a product or transcription factor 
 
6 Models of interactions across dozens of genes are often in the form of wiring diagrams. 
These models involve enough genes that they are computably intractable within the 
framework of standard evolutionary genetics.  
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protein (tf) from one locus and a binding site or cis regulatory region on another locus. The 
stronger the bind, the more product the regulated gene produced. The concept of binding 
strength was roughly interpretable as a feature of molecular processes, and it was 
programmable for computer simulation.7 
 
 
Figure 1: Gene regulatory pathway. The topmost interaction represents a close fit between 
the transcription factor from the allele at locus B and the cis region for allele C, yielding 
more products from C than in the bottommost interaction, which represents a looser fit. 
Reprinted with modifications from (Johnson and Porter 2000, Fig. 2).  
 
The third model in the system was a set of three equations that JP wrote with the 
symbolic toolkit of evolutionary genetics. The first equation quantitatively defined binding 
 
7 The team developed a more biochemically realistic interpretation in their post 2008 work 
(Tulchinsky et al. 2014).  
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strength. The second equation defined an organism’s phenotype as the product of all of the 
binding strengths in its regulatory pathway. Those two equations captured the mechanistic 
details of gene regulatory epistasis. The third equation defined an organism’s fitness as the 
difference between its phenotypic value and the value of the optimal phenotype for its 
environment, which JP could define for pure analysis or simulation. With those three 
equations, JP had a precise model with which to study the potential for evolution within 
lineages due to variations in gene regulatory structures. 
The fourth model was of organismal development and generational turnover. 
Organisms were hermaphrodites with few features, save for carrying the variable molecular 
interactions of interest. They were born, contributed gametes to a random gene pool, and died 
before the next generation was born. Each generation the pool of organisms faced two culling 
events, one random and one due to variation in fitnesses.  
 
Evaluation Strategies 
 JP used at least three strategies to evaluate their multi-model system. First, they 
compared results from simulations using their multi-model system to results analytically 
inferred from a more-idealized version of their multi-model system. To create the more-
idealized system, JP used the same four models described above, but they introduced several 
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assumptions on the evolutionary genetic equations.8 These assumptions enabled JP to derive 
probability distributions of expected fitnesses for hybrids of any given parental populations 
and any given generation. Next, they defined five discrete categories of fitness values (e.g., 
W ≥ 0.9, or 0.1 ≥ W ≥ .01), and they derived the expected probabilities for each category 
from the distributions. For example, the simplest case involved pathways of two genes each 
with one allele. After enough generations across infinite replications, half of the replicates 
would yield strongly unfit hybrids. For more complex regulatory structures, the proportion of 
strongly unfit hybrids would increase (Johnson and Porter 2000). These expected 
probabilities showed qualitative similarity with the predictions of the verbal model, and they 
became quantitative predictions for comparison with simulation results.   
For their simulations, JP wrote a custom program that incorporated all of the models 
described above, performed selection on populations for thousands of generations, made 
hybrids, and calculated and recorded values for individual and population average fitnesses 
and phenotypes. For any set of starting conditions, JP ran dozens to hundreds of simulations, 
 
8 For instance, one assumption stipulated that at any given generation, each parental 
population exhibits exactly the mean optimal phenotype, regardless of the underlying genetic 
regulatory structures, which could differ across individuals and the two populations. In 
simulated or actual populations, parental populations at any given generation would, due to 
selection, approximate optimal phenotypes, but they wouldn’t exhibit exact optimal 
phenotypes. 
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also called replicates or runs. Then they collected and summarized the distributions of fitness 
and phenotype values across replicates, which they compared to the expected distributions 
derived from the more-idealized multi-model system.  
For a second evaluation technique, JP compared the results of simulations with one 
set of starting conditions and parameter values against those of the same multi-model system 
but with different starting conditions or parameter values. JP systematically varied parameter 
values like mutation and migration rates; starting conditions like population size, complexity 
of regulatory pathways, number of generations; and the type of selection process, such as 
one-way directional, two-way directional, and stabilizing. 
For a third technique, JP developed a multi-model system that shared the organismal 
and BDM models, but had a more standard (multiplicative) model of gene epistasis in place 
of JP’s (regulatory) model. They compared the results of simulations on similar parameter 
values across those two multi-model systems.  
 
Results 
JP established several primary results. First, their simulated results were 
quantitatively similar, within 95% confidence limits, to their analytical predictions. For 
instance, for repeated runs on the simplest case, final hybrid mean fitnesses were very high    
( > 0.8) in 49.7 percent of runs and very low ( <  10-4) in 50.3 percent of runs, which was 
consistent with their analytical predictions of 50 percent for each (Johnson and Porter 2000). 
As the team increased the complexity of the regulatory model to include up to 10 loci and up 
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to 2 alleles per loci, the proportion of hybrids with very low frequencies increased with the 
complexity of the regulatory model. Furthermore, simulations of the multi-model system that 
used the standard (multiplicative) model of epistasis yielded radically different results. In 
none of its runs did hybrids have fitnesses lower than 0.5, and in most they were higher than 
0.8.  
These results indicated that selection on phenotypes, which arose from regulatory 
molecular pathways, could lead to HI and speciation much more rapidly than could selection 
on phenotypes that developed due to genes that were linked via non-regulatory epistasis. JP 
modified their research system, and reached complementary results, for cases of occasional 
gene flow between parental populations (Porter and Johnson 2002), and for cases of 
pleiotropic gene regulation (Johnson and Porter 2007).  
 
5- Prototypes and Proof of Concept Demonstrations 
Prototypes are artifacts that are importantly novel compared to their historical 
forerunners. For JP, the prototypes were the verbal model and the precise multi-model 
systems that included the BDM, gene-regulatory, evolutionary-genetic equation, and 
organismal development models. Proof of concept demonstrations establish prototypes by 
showing that prototypes achieve functions desired of them. For JP, these demonstrations 
showed that the multi-model systems describe, predict, and explain abstract and general 
phenomena of rapid speciation.  For the rest of this section, I articulate two kinds of proof of 
concept demonstrations used by JP: coherence models calibration and scope demonstration.  
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Coherence Models Calibration 
Coherence models calibrations (CMCs) are arguments that show that a set of non-
identical models or model systems yield results that are relevantly comparable, that the 
models are coherent with each other, and that they denote the same target systems. The 
general structure of CMCs is similar to that for what philosophers call derivational 
robustness, so it’s important to clearly distinguish the two (Weisberg 2006; Woodward 2006; 
Wimsatt 2007; Kuorikoski et al. 2010). Both aim to infer something about two or more 
distinct models or multi-model systems by comparing the results derived from those 
disparate models, which we have no a priori reasons to believe will yield identical results. 
For derivational robustness, consider a model from which researchers analytically derive a 
result, and consider that the model is comprised partly by assumptions, some of which 
describe causal mechanisms or processes, but others of which introduce known falsehoods to 
enable the derivation. In such cases, researchers worry that the result may be due to the false 
assumptions. So they construct a second model, or more, with the same causal assumptions 
but different false assumptions that also enable the derivation. If researchers derive the same 
results or theorems from those additional models, then they conclude that theorems or results 
are robust to different assumptions.  
Like derivational robustness arguments, CMCs compare different models that denote 
roughly the same phenomena or processes, they compare results derived from the different 
models, and they do so by considering those models under different assumptions. Unlike 
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derivational robustness arguments, CMCs enable comparisons of models developed with 
different symbolic toolkits. They also enable comparisons of results characterized within 
those toolkits, even if those results were demonstrated with rules or techniques particular to 
those toolkits.9    
 JP’s CMC, represented in Figure 2, is as follows. There are three multi-model 
systems, each of which is a prototype, designated as M1, M2, and M3. And there are three 
outcomes, O1, O2, O3, each of which is specific to its similarly indexed multi-model system. 
M1 represents JP’s verbal or natural language model, and O1 is the outcome demonstrated via 
informal verbal reasoning from the model.10 For JP, the verbal model encompasses their 
descriptions of gene regulatory pathways and speciation processes, and the relevant outcome 
is the claim that selection on the former can influence the latter, as shown by the quoted 
passage in the previous section. M2 is the most-idealized multi-model system of the two 
 
9 Given these generalizations, it may prove useful to class derivational robustness 
demonstrations and CMCs as kinds of a more general form of argument, a project for further 
study.  
10 I take ‘outcome’ to denote a broad class of things producible from a model, such as a 
theorem or a set of simulated results. Similarly, I take ‘demonstration’ to denote a broad class 
of reasoning strategies that may include analytic derivations, abductive or inductive 
inferences, or simulated results. In this latter use, I follow Hughes’s account of denotation, 
demonstration, and interpretation account of modelling (Hughes 1999). 
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precise systems JP created. Importantly, M2 is an explication of M1 in a mathematical 
framework capable of making precise assumptions and analytic inferences. O2, which JP 
analytically derived from M2, includes the expected probabilities for discrete fitness 
categories across infinitely possible replications. M3 is JP’s operationalization of M2 and was 
programed into software to enable simulations of evolving populations. While it shares many 
idealizing assumptions of M2, it lacks those that enable analytic inferences from M2. To 
generate results from M3, JP had to run their simulations, which yielded data about, among 
other things, fitness and phenotype values in parental populations and in hybrids. They then 
structured these data in data models and analyzed them across many replicates to yield 
proportions of replicates with speciation events, which comprise O3. 
 
 
Figure 2: Johnson and Porter’s Coherence Models Calibration.  
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Key to JP’s evaluation of their CMC is the comparison of results, specifically O2 to 
O1 and O3 to O2. In Figure 2, I label the relevant relations as qualitative similarity and 
quantitative similarity, respectively. JP used an implicit and somewhat vague notion of 
qualitative similarity to compare O2 to O1. But they used explicit relations of quantitative 
similarity or predictive accuracy to compare O3 to O2.11 Based on their verbal model (M1), JP 
inferred that selection on gene regulatory networks could lead to hybrid incompatibilities 
(HI) and eventually speciation (O1). Based on a highly idealized set of models couched in the 
mathematical language of theoretical evolutionary genetics (M2), JP derived probability 
distributions for hybrid fitnesses. These showed that for the simplest systems, speciation 
would occur in half of the replicates, and more often in more complex systems (O2). This 
outcome was qualitatively similar to that of the verbal model. After they operationalized 
those models for computer simulation (M3), JP simulated biological systems and collected 
results (O3) that were statistically significant and similar to those analytically inferred. Thus, 
 
11 These similarity relations are called prediction for several reasons. First, the analytic 
distributions are conceptually prior, in an inferential sense, to the tabulated distributions 
generated from the computer simulations, when both are used in a statistical test of similarity. 
Second, the analytic distributions can be calculated before, or temporally prior, to the 
tabulated distributions, thus establishing an expectation to be met or not in simulated 
systems. For the JP case, the first sense is more relevant than the second, but the ambiguity of 
‘prediction’ is confusing enough for me to talk instead about quantitative similarity.  
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they showed that their M3 could represent, predict, and explain possible speciation processes. 
Their CMC showed that M1, M2, M3 are coherent with each other, that they denote the same 
target phenomenon or process despite being constructed with different symbolic toolkits.  
Figure 2 and the discussion above capture much about reasoning practices in 
theoretical evolutionary genetics. The relations between M1, M2, O1, and  O2 make explicit the 
relations and framework for purely formal work as discussed by Servedio et al. (2014) and to 
some extent Plutynski (2006b), and they clearly distinguish models from demonstrations. 
Furthermore, the relations between M2, M3, O2, and  O3 indicate how simulation studies, now 
widely used in the field, fit into Servedio et al.’s approach. Thus, the account of CMCs builds 
on Servedio et al.’s account of proof of concept research while avoiding its limitations.  
 
 
Figure 3: General Framework for Coherence Models Calibrations.  
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Figure 2 can be generalized. If used in other fields, the overall structure of models 
and outcomes might be the same, but due to different disciplinary norms and standards, the 
specific coherence relations between models and the specific comparison relations between 
outcomes might differ. These relations also depend on the kinds of questions pursued and 
systems studies. Figure 3 represents a more general structure for CMCs. For it, between 
models there are coherence relations, of which explicatory and operational relations are 
kinds. Furthermore, between outcomes there are comparative relations, of which qualitative 
and quantitative similarity relations are kinds. Demonstrations from M3 to O3 are more 
generally characterized as applied generalizations, and they can involve computer 
simulations, tests via empirical data collection, etc. Importantly, any given project may 
forego either analytic or applied demonstrations, or it may combine them. But to use a CMC, 
a project must compare at least results or outcomes demonstrated from at least two models or 
multi-model systems built with different symbolic toolkits.  
In general a team establishes a prototype via a CMC by arguing as follows:  
(1) Coherence relation1 between M1 and M2 is met. 
(2) Standards of inference are met for the Natural Language and Formalized/Analytic 
Demonstrations.  
(3) Comparative relation1 between O1 and O2 is met.  
(4) Coherence relation2 between M2 and M3 is met. 
(5) Standards of inference are met for the Applied Demonstration.  
(6) Comparative relation2 between O2 and O3 is met.  
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Two inferences are implicit in proof of concept demonstrations via CMC.  
(7) If (1), (2), and (3) are true; then M1 and M2 are mutually coherent, that is, they 
denote the same target system.  
(8) If (4), (5), (6), and (7) are true; then M1, M2, and M3 are mutually coherent, that is, 
they denote the same target system for at least the starting conditions, parameter 
values, and assumptions specified.  
 
When researchers show that (1) through (8) are true, they show that a series of models built 
from different symbolic toolkits denote the same phenomena or target system. They are 
conceptually of a piece.12 
Model calibrating denotes the activities of building an argument like (1) through (8), 
which can be represented in a graphic like Figure 3. In the course of a project, a team 
calibrates their package of models M1 through M3 to each other. They ensure that community 
or disciplinary standards are met. If any of those standards are violated, then a team must 
tinker with their package of models. They may adjust parameter values, model structures, or 
formalisms used to represent their models. In tough cases, they may question and adjust 
disciplinary standards.  
 
12 CMCs might be used to elucidate positions about the relative epistemic value of simulated 
results compared to empirical results (Winsberg 2015), a project for further study.  
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Scope Demonstration  
Scope demonstrations are arguments that establish the range of phenomena to which a 
model or multi-model system applies. A scope demonstration builds on a previously 
employed demonstration, like a CMC, which is often relative to a singular set of starting 
conditions, parameter values, and other background assumptions. To determine the range of 
target systems or phenomena for which the models are coherent with each other, researchers 
systematically alter those conditions, values, and assumptions, and they re-compare the 
outcomes. This practice of systematic alteration has been discussed in literature related to 
exploratory experimentation (Elliott 2007), computer simulation (Winsberg 2015), and 
sensitivity analysis, a second kind of robustness analysis (Weisberg 2006; Woodward 2006; 
Wimsatt 2007). In a given project, a scope demonstration represents the results of those 
systematic alterations, and it argues for a range of phenomena to which the model applies. 
When the alterations are to real world systems, the conclusion is about the range of actual 
phenomena. When they are to theoretical systems, the conclusion is about the range of 
possible systems, as in JP’s case.  
JP employed two kinds of scope demonstration. First, they compared results 
generated across the same multi-model system but with altered causal complexity (e.g., 2 
through 10 loci in gene regulatory pathways), different parameter values (e.g., mutation rate, 
migration rate), or simulation structures (e.g., number of replicates). An example of their 
results is represented in Figure 4. The figure compares the results generated from groups of 
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replicates differing in the causal complexity of the model used. The top of the figure shows a 
frequency distribution of hybrid fitnesses when the regulatory pathway spans 2 loci, and the 
bottom shows a similar distribution when the regulatory pathway spans 4 loci. The 
comparison shows that the more complex the pathway, the higher the proportion of hybrids 
with low fitnesses. JP constructed dozens of these comparisons, some of which showed how 
much parameter values could be altered before there would be effects on hybrid fitness 
values.  
 
 
Figure 4. Frequency distributions of hybrid fitnesses for pathways with 2 and with 4 
loci. Horizontal axis indicates number of replicates, vertical indicates fitness values 
discretized into 5 categories. Black bars indicate fitnesses above 0.5. All other parameter 
values and starting conditions held constant. The comparison indicates that the more complex 
the pathway, the higher the proportion of unfit hybrids. Reprinted with modifications from 
(Johnson and Porter 2000, Fig. 5).  
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For JP’s second kind of scope demonstration, they compared results generated across 
multi-model systems that differed not in degree of epistasis but in kind, and otherwise had 
identical parameter values, starting conditions, and simulation structures. In particular, they 
swapped out their gene regulatory mechanistic model and evolutionary genetic equations for 
a more traditional model and set of equations for additive epistasis. They reran their 
simulations and developed graphics, like those in Figure 4, for replicates using the traditional 
model. They then compared the new graphics to those developed for their regulatory multi-
model system.  
From both of these kinds of comparisons, JP established that, unlike the additive 
epistasis model system, their multi-model system could account for rapid speciations that 
happened in fewer than several thousand generations in a BDM scenario. These results didn’t 
confirm their multi-model system or disconfirm the more traditional account of additive 
epistasis. Rather, they showed the types of target systems to which each applied. As JP 
continued their project over the years, scope demonstrations became increasingly important 
to them, and they devised increasingly sophisticated means of comparing simulated results 
(Porter and Johnson 2002; Johnson and Porter 2007, Tulchinsky et al. 2014).  
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6- Post Facto Arguments 
Researchers use post facto arguments to license further research beyond the context in 
which a prototype was established. Post facto arguments employ heuristics in Wimsatt’s 
sense of non-truth preserving algorithms used by agents of bounded rationality, especially in 
contexts of transforming intractable problems into tractable ones. Heuristics typically rely on 
imperfect or false models of the world that sometimes fail in systematic ways (Wimsatt 2007, 
Chs. 5 & 6). In this section, I describe three heuristics that scientists use in arguments after 
they have established prototypes, illustrating them with JP’s case.  
The first heuristic involves the portability of the models to further research contexts 
and phenomena of study.  
 
(H1)  If a proof of concept has been demonstrated (e.g. (7) and (8) are true), then the 
theory, model, or package of models used in the demonstration (e.g. M1, M2, 
and M3) can be used to study phenomena or target systems for which 
justifiably similar assumptions and parameter values apply.  
 
(H1) accommodates Kendig’s (2016) account of the transportability of prototypes and 
generalizes it to include proof of concept demonstrations in a wider array of investigative 
contexts beyond wet-lab experiments. Furthermore, when coupled with a scope 
demonstration, (H1) can be generalized to address a range of parameter values, assumptions, 
and starting conditions from a scope demonstration.     
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I locate arguments that use (H1) not as part of the proof of concept demonstration 
itself, as Kendig seems to, but as post facto arguments. Doing so enables us to distinguish the 
epistemic success of a proof of concept demonstration from the dispersive effects of such 
demonstrations. Not all prototypes are exported to further research contexts, even if they 
have successfully proved a concept. Drawing this distinction also saves us from having to 
treat all cases of science that employ a heuristic like (H1) as cases of proof of concept 
research. As a heuristic, (H1) can be tweaked to excise talk of ‘proof of concept’, and then it 
can be seen as a special case of a more general heuristic of empiricism.  
 (H1) invokes the phrase “justifiably similar” to underwrite the scope of exportability. 
This phrase is important for several reasons. First, those reasons that justify similarity are 
context-dependent. The kinds of reasons that researchers give for exporting models in one 
discipline may differ quite a bit from the kinds of reasons given in a different discipline. For 
any given discipline, those local norms must be described to better understand if and how 
these heuristics are applied, and how they may mislead. Second, and more importantly, the 
phrase enables a place for relations between simple and more complex models that target the 
same phenomenon, a feature central to the rationale of many proof of concept projects but 
often overlooked by philosophers. For researchers, many phenomena are too complex to be 
understood with extant models, so they adopt an iterative approach to achieve understanding 
(Elliott 2012). They begin by building the simplest model with which they can still account 
for some key features of the complex phenomenon they are studying. When they can show 
that those models in fact account for those key features, that is—they provide a proof of 
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concept demonstration for a novel model, then they assert that the models can be exported 
not just for understanding similar features in related phenomena, but for studying further 
features of the original complex phenomenon. In such cases, the prototype model functions 
as a template, on which researchers can add and subtract elements to account for increasingly 
complex phenomena.  
In short, the phrase “justifiably similar” enables models to be exported so as to apply 
to analogous phenomena in different target systems (e.g. using HI models in different genera 
or using predator/prey models for cycles of economic growth), and to more complex systems 
of which the accounted-for phenomena provide but one set of features. This latter export, 
from simple systems to more complex ones, is a common reason for doing proof of concept 
demonstrations. JP relied on (H1) interpreted in this way to further develop their multi-model 
systems to include not just epistatic gene regulatory motifs, but also migration between 
organismal populations (Porter and Johnson 2002), pleiotropic gene regulatory motifs 
(Johnson and Porter 2007), and biochemically realistic interactions between genes and 
molecules (Tulchinsky et al. 2014). Regardless, JP exported their models and results only to 
scenarios of BDM-like speciation, which was for them one condition for successful 
projection.     
 A second heuristic focuses not on the models themselves, but on the practices or tools 
used to create them.  
 
(H2)  If a proof of concept has been demonstrated, then the tools or practices used to 
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construct and evaluate the relevant models or theories might fruitfully be used 
in justifiably similar research efforts. 
 
Researchers often look to proof of concepts demonstrations not for the models themselves, 
but for the practices, strategies, or tools used to construct and evaluate those models. As with 
(H1), proof of concept demonstrations aren’t necessary to heuristically argue to export 
practices or tools, but they are often sufficient. The JP case used many practices and 
strategies that, though not unique to the project, the team suggested others adopt (Johnson 
and Porter 2001). These include using individual-based simulations to operationalize and 
evaluate analytic theories, quantitatively evaluating speciation hypotheses, and making 
biologically realistic models of gene interactions and pleiotropy.  
 A third heuristic is about the allocation of resources for further use of the model. This 
heuristic is perhaps least appreciated by philosophers, but is in many ways central to the 
rationales for proof of concept projects. Those who discuss proof of concept projects in 
medical research note that establishing the effectiveness of a treatment, say a drug, is a 
process fraught with issues beyond the drug’s efficacy for ameliorating symptoms (Gould 
2005; Schmidt 2006). There are also issues of identifying and weighing the impacts of side-
effects, of ethical responsibilities to test subjects, and of the resources needed to further 
establish the efficacy of the drug. Issues of resource allocation are legitimate constraints on 
all scientific projects, including those in theoretical evolutionary genetics. If researchers are 
to make progress on understanding a complex phenomenon, such as rapid allopatric 
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speciation, then they must sort through the various strategies and tools for modelling that 
phenomenon and find those that, given the range of actual alternatives, are most promising. 
Proof of concept studies provide useful (and socially rewardable) means for doing so.  
 
(H3)  If a proof of concept has been demonstrated, then it is worth expending more 
resources on the development of the prototype model and the use of the 
strategies, practices, and tools used to construct the model.  
 
The desire to use this heuristic drives much—maybe most—of proof of concept research. JP 
relied on something like it when they applied and received, based on their initial results, an 
NSF grant to continue their work. Funding agencies often rely on (H3) when choosing which 
of several proposals to fund. JP relied on (H3) to justify their own time and resources to 
further develop the model after their initial results.  
In such cases, (H3) isn’t the only reason that factors into decisions. When choosing 
between two models to further fund or develop, decision makers might note that both 
functioned adequately in proof of concept demonstrations, but that one is cheaper 
(cognitively or financially) to reproduce and redeploy, or that both represented phenomena, 
but only one was also predictively accurate. In these cases, additional heuristics are used in 
decision making. Regardless, (H3) provides a baseline heuristic.  
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7- Conclusion 
This paper provides a general framework for proof of concept research, and it 
articulates the structures for some of the arguments used to evaluate such research. These 
results unify previous discussions of proof of concept research, and they further elucidate 
how researchers evaluate results from theoretical evolutionary genetics, an often contentious 
field, especially when pairing analytically derived theorems with computer simulations. 
These results also contribute to the program of articulating how researchers judge early stage 
science as successful or not.  
This conceptual framework indicates directions for further epistemological research. 
There are surely other kinds of proof of concept demonstrations and post facto heuristics 
beyond those discussed here, and those discussed here aren’t invoked in every case of proof 
of concept research. If further kinds are identified, articulated, and critiqued, then a wider 
array of research could become more clearly understood and perhaps be made financially 
respectable (O’Malley et al. 2009; Haufe 2013; Elliott et al. 2016).  
A particularly fruitful example of a further heuristic is about theory integration 
(Mitchell 2003; Laubichler et al. 2018). Often, when researchers provide a proof of concept 
demonstration, they show their peers that achieving a desired theoretical aim, such as theory 
integration, can be accomplished and is worth further effort. Such theoretical aims are 
longstanding features of research in theoretical evolutionary genetics (Plutynski 2004; 2005). 
JP explicitly address theory integration in a 2001 review article, in which they feature their 
multi-model system and modelling practices as examples by which to further develop a 
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mechanistic theory of adaptation (Johnson and Porter 2001, 45). With their proof of concept 
demonstration, JP cut through conceptual discussions about the (im)possibility of syntheses 
between developmental genetics and evolutionary genetics. Implicit is a fourth heuristic, 
such that if a proof of concept has been demonstrated with models from historically distinct 
theoretical frameworks, then researchers might fruitfully integrate more aspects of those 
frameworks to study hitherto intractable phenomena. This heuristic provides a promising 
object for further study. 
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